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Abstract: Using data on 2317 mother-daughter pairs from 10 European countries, we 
investigate the impact of downward time and monetary transfers on the career choices of 
transfer-receiving young mothers. For Europe as a whole, we find a strong positive effect 
of grandchild care on the labor force participation and the degree of labor market 
involvement of the young mother, but no impact of monetary transfers on either of these 
decisions. Both recipients and donors with better endowments are more likely to 
participate in a monetary transaction, while mothers with lower level of human capital are 
more likely to provide time transfers to their better endowed daughters. 
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21. Introduction 
During the past several decades, decreasing fertility rates and rising life 
expectancy turned the attention of economists towards several major implications of 
population ageing around the world. On the one hand, researchers have forecasted the 
impact of a shrinking labor force on economic growth and the fiscal sustainability of the 
pay-as-you-go pension system. They have proposed an increase in retirement age and 
phasing out of the public pension premium over time as solution to the economic 
challenges (Börsch-Supan, 2001, Beetsma et alii, 2003). In an alternative, but related 
analytical framework, economists have explored the impact of the rising demand for 
informal elderly care on the labor supply of the care provider. This impact was typically 
found to be significant and negative (Boaz and Muller, 1992, Ettner, 1995, 1996). 
Despite the stylized negative impacts of female labor market participation on 
fertility and of institutional inflexibility on the balancing of motherhood and career1, 
significantly less attempt has been made to explore the impact of the complex gamut of 
downward intergenerational transfers on the career and childcare choices of the younger 
generation in the shrinking labor markets of developed aging economies. The large body 
of research addressing the choice of childcare and work among mothers typically 
concentrates on the labor market implications of government induced monetary 
incentives (see for instance Gronau, 1973, Heckman, 1974, Blau and Robins, 1988). At 
the same time, the literature studying the impact of downward intergenerational transfers 
on the labor supply of young individuals has focused predominantly on consequences of 
downward monetary gifts such as human capital investment or work disincentives 
(Becker and Tomes, 1976, Ehrenberg and Sherman, 1987, Wolff, 2006). 
 To the best of our knowledge, the only two microeconomic studies that address 
the impact of intergenerational solidarity on the choice between motherhood and work 
explore the link between co-residence and the labor supply of young women (Ogawa and 
Ermisch, 1996, Sasaki, 2002). Both studies find a positive impact of intergenerational co-
residence on the labor supply of young female participants in the intergenerational 
exchange and this result is interpreted as indicative of a high correlation of co-residence 
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 See for instance the special issue of the Journal of Labor Economics (1985). 
3and downward transfers, and hence a positive effect of the latter on the work effort of the 
recipient. 
This leaves out of focus not only the potentially important implications of 
intergenerational solidarity in both co-residing and non-co-residing households, but also 
the qualitatively different implications of the receipts of monetary and time transfers. 
There is strong evidence that while co-residence in countries such as those of Western 
Europe and the United States is decreasingly frequent, time services (especially in the 
form of grandchild care) are non-decreasing and indeed on the rise (Tobio, 2001, Leira et 
alii, 2005). From the point of view of economic performance, different types of 
downward transfers may have different implications. Macro-theoretical studies suggest 
that while time transfers increase the labor force participation of young people, monetary 
transfers decrease their work effort (Cardia and Ng, 2003). 
 We provide further insight into the subject with the use of a simple theoretical 
model linking informal child care and monetary transfers provided by a benevolent parent 
to the time that a transfer-receiving child devotes to childcare, labor supply and leisure. 
We show that grandchild care has a positive effect on the labor supply of young mothers. 
We then test this hypothesis empirically, using data from10 different European countries. 
For Europe as a whole, we find a strong positive effect of grandchild care on both the 
labor force participation and labor market involvement decision of the mother, but no 
impact of monetary transfers on either of these decisions. Both recipients and donors with 
better endowments are more likely to participate in a monetary transaction, while mothers 
with lower level of human capital are more likely to provide time transfers to their better 
endowed daughters. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a 
model of transfers where an altruistic parent provides time and monetary resources to the 
child and the child decides how much time to devote to labor supply, childcare and 
leisure. We also discuss the implications of relaxing the altruism assumption at the end of 
this section. The hypotheses related to the relationship between grandchild care, 
monetary transfers and labor supply are tested using the European SHARE data set 
described in Section 3. The econometric results are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 
concludes.  
42. A model of labor supply and private transfers of time and money 
 We base our analysis on a simple theoretical model of private transfers, where 
parents help their children by providing grandchild care and/or financial gifts. To 
understand the link between the receipt of parental transfers and the child’s decision to 
undertake paid employment, we assume that the child’s labor supply is endogenous. 
  There are two main actors in the model: the parent (say a mother) and the adult 
child (say a daughter) who herself has at least one child. The grandchild has no role in 
our theoretical framework, but we need the presence of three generations in order to 
understand grandchild care as part of the time allocation process of both the mother and 
the daughter. In what follows, the parent and the child are denoted by subscripts p  and 
k , respectively
2
. We consider the following two-stage game.  
 In the first stage, the mother makes a transfer to her daughter in the form of either 
grandchild care or money. We assume that the parent is altruistic, in that her utility is an 
increasing function of her child’s welfare
3
. Furthermore, we assume that both the mother 
and the daughter are better off with the increased quality of grandchildren as a form of 
intergenerational solidarity. In the second stage, conditional on the parental transfer 
decision, the child decides how to allocate her time between hours of work, childcare 
activities and leisure. This recursive structure allows us to solve the model through 
backward induction. We begin by analyzing the daughter’s labor supply decision, after 
which we characterize the optimal pattern of parental transfers. 
 2.1. The daughter’s allocation of time 
 The daughter maximizes her utility represented by a continuous, twice 
differentiable and quasi-concave utility function v . This function is increasing in the 
amount of consumption kc , leisure kl  and the total time devoted to chidlcare, which we 
take as a proxy of child quality. The time devoted to childcare is the sum of the 
daughter’s childcare kg  and grandchild care s . The daughter faces the usual two 
constraints. First, the total amount of time (normalized to one) is devoted to hours of 
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 We assume income pooling at the household level for both the parent and the child, meaning that we 
neglect complex bargaining issues between spouses for each generation.  
5work kh , leisure kl , and childcare kg , such that 1=++ kkk glh . Secondly, the sum of 
labor resources kk hw , where kw is the wage rate and kh are the hours of work, the 
non-labor resources ky , and the total amount of monetary transfers T , is equal to the 
total amount of private consumption of the daughter. 
 The maximization problem for the daughter is therefore: 
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from which it follows that 32 vv = . The optimal allocation for the daughter is such that 
the marginal return of one hour spent in leisure activities is equal to the marginal return 
of one hour spent in childcare. To obtain closed form solutions and to highlight the role 
of private transfers (of either time or money) on the labor force participation of the 
daughter, we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function γ
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Using (4), (5) and (6), we can express the leisure time, childcare and market work as 
functions of the financial transfers and grandchild care, i.e. ),( sTll kk = , ),( Tsgg kk =
and ),( Tshh kk = . 
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 We discuss other theoretical possibilities in section 2.3. For a comprehensive review of the literature on 
private transfers, see Laferrère and Wolff (2006). 
6 There are several interesting characteristics of these expressions. First, grandchild 
care has a positive effect on the labor supply and the amount of leisure of the daughter. 
At the same time, grandchild care reduces the time devoted by the daughter to childcare. 
In other words, the receipt of grandchild care shifts the daughter’s time allocation from 
childcare to market work and leisure. Secondly, monetary transfers have a negative 
(income) effect on the labor market involvement of the daughter. Note that we do not 
account for public day care services. If such services were available, the monetary 
transfers could help women cover the cost of day care and join the labor force if their 
salary is higher than the cost of day care
4
. 
 2.2. The parental allocation of resources 
We now turn to the parental problem. As indicated earlier, the parental utility 
function u  is increasing in the child’s welfare (of which grandchild quality is an 
argument) as well as her own private consumption pc  and leisure pl . This means that 
both the mother and the daughter are better off with the increased quality of 
grandchildren as a form of intergenerational solidarity. As usual, u is continuous, twice 
differentiable, and quasi-concave. In addition, the mother faces the following two 
constraints. On the one hand, she allocates her time between labor supply ph , leisure time 
pl  and grandchild care s , such that 1=++ slh pp . On the other hand, her resources 
ppp yhw +  net of the financial transfer T  are devoted to private consumption pc . 
The parental maximization problem is therefore: 
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 The inability of providers of monetary as opposed to in-kind transfers to have full control over the choices 
made by the recipient makes the theoretical modelling of this possibility difficult (Pollak, 1988). 
Furthermore, for the purposes of our empirical analysis, we have no information on the specific use a 
monetary transfer. We do however control for differences in the availability of formal care by including 
country variables in our regressions and hence explore the impact of both time and monetary transfers, 
conditional on exogenously given institutionalized childcare resources.  
7which can be rewritten as :  
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From the corresponding first-order conditions 0/ =∂∂ plu , 0/ =∂∂ su  and 
0/ =∂∂ Tu , we obtain the following expressions: 
021 =+− uuwp         (8) 
0)( 33121111131 =+++−−+− vvgvlvgwvlwuuw kkkkkkp    (9) 
0)32221121231 =+++−−+− vgvlvvgwvlw(uu kkkkkk    (10) 
The interpretation of (8) is straightforward. The optimal time allocation of the mother is 
such that her marginal utility of leisure 2u  is equal to the corresponding marginal cost 
1uwp . In so far as (9) and (10) are concerned, we know from (2) and (3) that 21 vvwk =
and 31 vvwk = . Hence, the first-order conditions for grandchild care and the financial 
transfers can be simplified as follows:  
0331 =+− vuuwp         (11) 
0131 =+− vuu         (12) 
 On the one hand, the marginal cost 1uwp  for the mother of caring for the 
grandchildren is equal to the marginal altruistic benefit 
33vu  derived from the increase in 
the child’s level of well-being. On the other hand, the marginal utility lost by transferring 
money to the child 
1u  is equal to the child’s marginal utility of receiving money 13vu
5
. 
Combining (11) and (12) gives :  
13 / vwv p =          (13) 
For the child, the marginal benefit of receiving money is equal to the marginal 
benefit of receiving grandchild care. When this equality does not hold, a better outcome 
can be reached by reallocating parental resources between grandchild care and cash gifts. 
Finally, the optimal transfer functions for the parent depend on the monetary resources of 
the mother and the daughter, i.e. ),,,( kpkk yywwss =  and ),,,( kppk yywwTT = .  
8 2.3. Discussion and possible extensions 
 The theoretical prediction that is of greatest interest to us is the positive impact of 
grandchild care on the daughter’s labor force participation. This result is obtained in a 
setting where the daughter chooses between work, childcare and leisure activities and the 
grandchild’s well-being is a public good that affects the utility functions of both the 
daughter and the mother. Our model relies on the restrictive assumption of one-sided 
altruism, where the transfer decisions are made only by the mother. The daughter can 
neither influence them nor reject them; she simply takes the grandchild care and financial 
transfers as given. In other words, the two transfers are exogenous to the child. 
 In keeping with the existing literature on transfer motivations (Laferrère and 
Wolff, 2006), it could well be argued that a strategic interaction between the daughter and 
the mother would be more relevant in our case. One could imagine a situation where not 
only the mother attempts to influence the daughter’s labor supply by providing 
grandchild care services, but also the daughter attempts to extract transfers from her 
mother. Our model is just a special case of this more general framework. We have a 
Stackelberg equilibrium solution where the mother acts as a leader and the transfer is 
taken as given by the daughter, while in the more general Nash equilibrium situation both 
the mother would be affected by the daughter’s labor supply and the daughter would be 
affected by the time and cash transfers provided by the mother. 
 Dustmann et alii (2009) develop one such theoretical model where the labor 
supply of the child and the (cash) transfers from the parents are jointly determined. If 
applied to our context, this theoretical setting would lead to the following predictions. On 
the one hand, there would still be a positive relationship between grandchild care and the 
labor force participation of the daughter. On the other hand, there would be an additional 
effect of the daughter’s labor force participation on the parental transfers. The empirical 
relevance of this latter prediction is a priori unclear. It turns out to be insignificant in the 
empirical analysis of Dustmann et alii (2009) based on British teenagers. 
 Instead of assuming altruism between the mother and the daughter, one could try 
to explain the provision of parental transfers with the use of an exchange model. Static 
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 Interestingly, this standard first-order condition which links the parent’s and child’s marginal utility of 
consumption also holds in the basic altruistic model (Laferrère and Wolff, 2006). 
9exchange behavior does not seem very plausible in our case. Given that upstream 
transfers in the form of money are very infrequent in our context, we believe that 
exchange motivated grandchild care supply, whereby the donor provides a service in 
exchange for money as in Cox (1987), is very unlikely.  
Hence, the more plausible framework would be a dynamic one, whereby the 
provision of current period downward transfers of time and money on the part of the 
parent is stimulated by an exchange motive for repayment in terms of future supply of 
informal care to the parent. While we cannot rule out this possibility, it would be 
impossible for us to test the related hypothesis with the cross-sectional data available to 
us. At the same time, such delayed exchange would have no influence on the expected 
positive impact of grandchild care on the labor supply of the recipients, which is the main 
focus of our research.  
 Another shortcoming of our model is the presence of only one adult daughter. 
Once again, accounting for multiple adult children would not affect our theoretical 
predictions on the positive relationship between transfers and labor supply decisions. It 
would only provide additional insights into the intra-household allocation of resources, 
which have already been discussed elsewhere (Dimova and Wolff, 2008). Specifically, 
under the assumption of altruistic parental behavior, poorer daughters would receive 
more cash gifts than their siblings. At the same time, there is no clear prediction vis-a vis 
the effect of grandchild care receipts.  
Given that higher labour market potential (measured by higher wages which are a 
positive function of high levels of human capital, e.g. education and experience) 
increases the labour supply incentives of the child, under the assumption of altruism one 
would expect a positive association between grandchild care and better labour market 
opportunities of the recipient. The predictions are ambiguous under the exchange motive 
since the receipt of such services may be either positively or negatively correlated with 
the child’s wage.  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 3.1. The Share data 
10
 To estimate the relationship between downward transfers and labor participation, 
we use data from the first release of the SHARE data base. This data base contains 
detailed information on the financial, human capital, family and health status of people of 
more than 50 years of age for 10 different European countries
6
. Clearly, the transfer 
providing parent is the primary respondent to the SHARE questionnaire.  
 However, aside from detailed information on that primary respondent, the data 
base also contains some information on up to four randomly selected respondent’s 
children. This latter information includes not only human capital characteristics, but also 
number of children, age of the youngest and eldest child, and labor force participation. 
Although information on the actual number of hours of work supplied by the child is 
missing, we are able to distinguish between different levels of labor force involvement, 
such as full time work, part time work and no work, which provides sufficient grounds 
for analyzing the impact of transfers on the degree of labor market involvement of the 
recipient.  
 Our data set has several interesting features related to intergenerational transfers. 
To begin with, when the data set was compiled, only one member of each household gave 
response to questions related to the provision of grandchild care and cash gifts and the 
respective response was repeated in the column related to the spouse of that respondent. 
The data compiling methodology is hence consistent with the assumption of pooling of 
resources within the households. Secondly, while we do have information on the 
characteristics of both biological and non-biological children of the respondents, 
information on the characteristics of sons and daughters in-law is absent. 
 The literature gives us little guideline on how to overcome this shortcoming of the 
data. While there are several studies on both upward and downward financial transfers 
(Arrondel and Masson, 2006, Laferrère and Wolff, 2006), as well as upward services in 
the form of informal care for disabled elderly parents (Ettner, 1995, Pezzin and Schone, 
1999), economic studies on grandchild care are virtually absent. However, the bulk of the 
sociological literature indicates that not only grandmothers, as opposed to grandfathers, 
are the primary suppliers of grandchild care but also grandchild care supply is more likely 
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 For further information and download of the data, see the following url http:\\www.share-project.org. The 
countries included in the first release of SHARE (2004) are Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, 
Italy, Denmark, France, Greece and Switzerland. 
11
to affect the career prospects of the grandchild’s mother rather than the father (Tobio, 
2001). Moreover, sociological evidence indicates that it is the maternal grandmother who 
tends to be the primary supplier of grandchild care in Europe (Tobio, 2001, Herlyn, 2001, 
Dench and Ogg, 2001, 2002). 
 Hence, we overcome the limitations of our data by restricting our sample to 
mothers and their adult daughters who have at least one child. We further restrict our 
sample to the relevant cases of daughters in working age and grandchildren young 
enough to need care. Given the evidence of highest amount of grandchild care supply 
being provided to children younger than 10 years of age, we treat this age as our upper 
bound (Tobio, 2001). Our final sample contains 2317 observations.  
Let us now describe our main variables of interest. Our monetary transfer variable 
takes the value of one if, during the reference period, the respondent has provided a 
monetary transfer of 250 or more euros to any of her children. We can also distinguish 
between infrequent grandchild care (grandchild care provided on less than a weekly 
basis), frequent grandchild care (care provided on a daily or weekly basis) and no 
grandchild care during the same reference period. Experimentation with the data 
indicated that only frequent grandchild care has significant influence on the labor supply 
of the recipient. Hence, we define a grandchild care variable taking the value of one if the 
donor provides grandchild care on a daily or weekly basis.  
We define two different dependent variables for our labor supply equation: (i) a 
variable taking the value of one if the transfer recipient provides any labor supply and 0 
otherwise, and (ii) a variable taking the value of zero if the recipient does not participate 
in the labor market, a value of one if she participates on a part time basis, and a value of 
two if she works full time.  
 According to the theoretical framework, the main explanatory variables should be 
the income levels and the wage rates of both the donor and the recipient. The data set 
contains continuous variables of the total current and asset income of the donor’s 
household and we use these variables as proxies for the parent’s income. Unfortunately, 
we do not have information on the income of the recipient. We assume that it is highly 
correlated with her human capital and household level characteristics such as age, 
education, marital status, number of children and age of the youngest child. We therefore 
12
include these variables directly into the transfer and labor supply equations. Our “further 
education” variable is comparable across the different countries and takes a value of one 
if the recipient of transfers has tertiary education.  
 One of the major shortcoming of the data is the lack of information on wages. 
However, as emphasized by Ettner (1996), empirical construction of wage rates for non-
workers involves issues of identification. We therefore follow the empirical literature in 
including factors influencing the wage (such as age, education and family status) directly 
in our equations as a proxy for the potential wage rate7.  
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 highlights the descriptive statistics for four different combinations of 
intergenerational transfers: (i) neither monetary transfer nor grandchild care, (ii) 
monetary transfer and no grandchild care, (iii) grandchild care and no monetary transfer, 
and (iv) monetary transfer and grandchild care. While the age of the recipient of transfers 
does not vary significantly across the categories, we do observe that better educated 
recipients are more likely to receive a monetary rather than a time transfer from wealthier 
and better educated parents
8
.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 Expectedly, our statistics also indicate that the acts of not donating and not 
receiving any transfers are increasing functions in the number of children of the donor 
and the recipient and the age of the grandchild and a decreasing function of the good 
health condition of the provider of transfers.  
 Table 2 highlights the characteristics of the recipients of transfers by employment 
status, namely full time employment, part time employment and not working. 
Expectedly, better educated and more experienced mothers are more likely to work, while 
low level of education has a strong influence on not working. At the same time, the 
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 While our data set does not provide a health variable for the daughter, we include a health variable of the 
mother in the transfer equations. The rationale for this is that health may be a larger determinant of 
economic outcomes for the mother, given her age, and may therefore be an important proxy for opportunity 
costs in her decision to provide transfers. 
8
 The mean of further education exceeds 0.75-0.80 in the case of monetary receipt whether simultaneously 
with a time transfer or without a time transfer, the mean of further education ranges around 0.60 among 
mothers not receiving monetary transfers. In addition, we find higher means of the current income variables 
among providers of monetary, as opposed to providers of time transfers. 
13
degree of labor market involvement (full-time versus part time) is a negative function of 
the number of young children and a positive function of the age of the daughter. Married 
mothers are slightly more likely to not work than to work, indicating at least a weak 
impact of double earnings on labor force participation among women with children. 
Finally, the provision of frequent grandchild care for our sample as a whole appears to 
stimulate the labor force participation of the recipient, while monetary transfers tend to 
discourage full time labor force involvement. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Overall, our preliminary descriptive analysis is consistent with the prediction of 
our theoretical model. We do observe for the sample as a whole that time transfers 
encourage the labor force participation of the recipient, while monetary transfers 
discourage it. The rest of our descriptive analysis is also in conformity with expectations. 
Higher degree of human capital of the mother is associated with both a higher level of 
labor market participation and higher probability of receipt of monetary as opposed to 
time transfers. At the same time, donors with better human capital characteristics are 
more likely to donate monetary as opposed to time transfers. Finally, higher level of 
family involvement, captured by larger number of children and lower age of the youngest 
child, discourages not only labor force participation, but also the receipt and donation of 
transfers.  
 As intergenerational relations do not exist in a vacuum, but are conditioned on an 
institutional framework, within which they develop, it is worthwhile devoting some 
attention to the possible cross-country differences in transfers and labor supply. As 
indicated earlier, we distinguish among three different categories of grandchild care: (i) 
regular care on a daily or weekly basis, (ii) irregular care of less than weekly basis and 
(iii) no grandchild care. Figure 1 highlights the cross-national distribution of the different 
types of grandchild care. The most striking observation is the significant difference in 
time transfers across Nordic, South European and other continental European countries. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
South European countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, are marked by the 
highest incidence of regular grandchild care, with Greece experiencing the highest 
incidence of more than 50%. Interestingly, these are also the countries experiencing the 
14
highest incidence of no grandchild care, with the highest incidence of no grandchild care 
occurring for instance among approximately 50% of the Spanish grandmothers. This 
pattern is consistent with the lowest among the continental European countries level of 
generosity of formal maternity and childcare benefits in combination with low level of 
flexibility of the South European labor markets (Gauthier, 2002, Leira et alii, 2005). 
These institutional constraints make it virtually impossible for young mothers in these 
countries to pursue a career unless they receive a high level of informal childcare 
assistance (Tobio, 2001). 
 At the other end of the spectrum, Sweden and Denmark account for the lowest 
incidence of regular grandchild care (about 20% of the cases) and highest incidence of 
irregular grandchild care (about 50% of the cases in Denmark and 40% of the cases in 
Sweden). Once again, this observation is consistent with the institutional framework of 
the labor markets and social security systems in these countries, namely high social 
security generosity and high level of labor market flexibility (Gauthier, 2002, Leira, 
1991).  
With some variation, the rest of the countries are characterized by a more 
balanced distribution of time transfers across regular, irregular care and no care, with 
Switzerland experiencing the highest incidence of regular care, in fact regular grandchild 
care similar to that of Italy and Greece, and the Netherlands experiencing the lowest 
incidence of regular care. The former observation is consistent with the relatively low 
level of formal maternity and childcare benefits in Switzerland (Gauthier, 2002), while 
the latter is consistent with the high level of flexibility of the Dutch labor market, 
allowing for higher availability of part-time employment for young mothers than in any 
other European country (Gerhard et alii, 2005). 
Figure 2 highlights the distribution of monetary transfers across the countries in 
the sample. While the difference in the provision of these transfers is both of a smaller 
scale and more similar across institutional settings, we do observe a higher incidence of 
such transfers in the northern compared to the southern countries in the sample, i.e. the 
countries characterized by more generous compared to the countries characterized by less 
generous family policies. As these two sets of countries stand at two extremes in terms of 
time transfers, this observation perhaps provides some evidence that institutional 
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characteristics may influence the substitution of different types of transfers by the 
parents. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 Finally, Figure 3 highlights the distribution of labor force participation across full 
time, part time and no work activities of the daughter. Once again, we observe marked 
differences across Nordic, Southern and other continental European countries, which are 
consistent with the time transfer patterns and our expectations based on the institutional 
frameworks of these countries’ labor markets and social security systems.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Not surprisingly, Sweden and Denmark are characterized by the highest level 
(more than 50%) full time labor market participation and the lowest level (less than 30%) 
inactivity. An equally high level of full time labor force participation and low level of 
inactivity is observed in France. By contrast, while experiencing a slightly smaller, but 
equally significant level of full time labor force participation of approximately 50%, 
young mothers in Spain, Italy and Greece are also characterized by the highest level of 
inactivity, approximately 40%.  
As indicated earlier, this dichotomy of high level of inactivity and full time 
employment, but virtually inexistent part-time work, points out one of the highest levels 
of labor market inflexibility in Europe. On the contrary, women in Germany, Netherlands 
and Switzerland are characterized by the highest level of part time and the lowest level of 
full time labor force involvement, but also significant level of inactivity. In other words, 
we do observe significant differences in both transfers and labor supply across 
institutional settings and therefore find it essential to control for these differences in our 
empirical analysis. 
4/ Econometric analysis 
The solutions to our theoretical model leave us with four reduced form equations: 
two equations of time and monetary transfers, provided by the mother as a function of the 
incomes and wage rates of the mother and the daughter, and two equations for the time 
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allocation of the daughter as a function of the maternal time and monetary transfers
9
. Due 
to data limitations, we are only able to estimate one of the latter two equations. We 
proceed in the following way.  
First, we describe the results from the base model of labor supply as a function of 
time and monetary transfers. Next, we check whether the positive effect of grandchild 
care on the labor participation of the daughter is still valid after we control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the household level. Finally, we estimate jointly the 
determinants of private transfers and labor force participation of the daughter and allow 
for the possibility that the residuals of the transfer equations are correlated with those of 
the labor supply equation.  
 4.1. The relationship between transfers and labor participation 
 Following the theoretical framework, the child’s latent variable related to her 
propensity to work *
kh  depends on a set of exogenous covariates kX  and on the parental 
transfers s  and T . The econometric counterpart of the labor equation is : 
hTskk TsXhk εγγβ +++=*       (14) 
where kX  is a set of variables that explain the daughter’s decision to work, kβ  is the 
corresponding vector of parameters, and hε  is a normally distributed error term. The 
coefficients sγ  and Tγ  capture the effect of grandchild care and cash gifts on the labor 
supply of the daughter.  
 As there is no information on the number of working hours in the survey, in what 
follows we focus on the discrete work related decisions of the child. The latent variable 
*h  is not observed, but we have 1=h  when the child works ( 0* >h ) and 0=h
otherwise. Hence, (14) defines a simple Probit model. Furthermore, given our data-based 
ability to distinguish between full time and part time labor supply, we explore as an 
additional case the impact of parental transfers on the child’s choice between full time 
work, part time work and no work. The dependent variable h  is now 0=h  if the 
                                                          
9
 Since the amounts of time devoted to work, leisure and childcare by the daughter sum up to the fixed total 
amount of time available to her, we only need to estimate 2 out of the 3 relationships summarized in 
equations (4), (5) and (6).   
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daughter does not work, 1=h  if the daughter works part time, and 2=h  if the daughter 
works full time. This defines an ordered Probit model of labor supply. 
 The estimates from these two regressions are highlighted in Table 3; column one 
highlights the results from the Probit analysis, while column two highlights the results 
from the ordered Probit analysis. We observe that the coefficient of the grandchild care 
variable in the labor force participation equation is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. After calculating the corresponding marginal effects, we find that the labor force 
participation probability of the daughter increases by 11.5 percentage points with 
grandchild care, the predicted probability for the whole sample being 67.3% (calculated 
at the means of the sample). The coefficient of the monetary variable is negative, but 
insignificant at any conventional level.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 Similarly, the coefficient of the grandchild care variable in the ordered Probit 
equation of labor market involvement is equal to 0.232. It is once again significant at the 
1 percent level, while the coefficient of the monetary variable is once again not. In other 
words, our empirical results indicate that while grandchild care has a positive impact on 
both the labor force participation of the daughter and on her degree of labor market 
involvement, monetary transfers have no impact on either of these variables. 
 The rest of the results on the labor supply of the daughter are consistent with our 
hypotheses and conventional logic. We find that higher levels of education and 
experience (proxied by the age variable) have a strong positive impact on both the labor 
force participation and the degree of labor market involvement of the young mother, 
while the number of children and their younger ages have negative impact on both these 
variables. The marital status variable is not significant in either equation at any 
conventional level. Finally, our cross-country results are consistent with those highlighted 
in Figure 2, but they are difficult to interpret since they may be picking up either 
differences in the functioning of the labor markets or differences in the supply of formal 
childcare10.  
                                                          
10
 A shortcoming of the data is that we have no information on the daughter’s location. For instance, there 
may be some differences in the supply of childcare services depending on whether the daughter lives in a 
rural or urban area. 
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 4.2. Unobserved heterogeneity and fixed effect estimates 
 One of the most useful characteristics of our data is the availability of information 
of up to 4 children per respondent. We are therefore able to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity by including a set of family fixed effects. For instance, if there are any 
family variables like child ability that are unobserved by the econometrician, but affect 
the labor supply of the child, the grandchild care estimates from the Probit and ordered 
Probit regressions would be biased.  
Instead of estimating a conditional Logit model à la Chamberlain, we estimate 
fixed effects Probit and ordered Probit models following the techniques recently 
developed by Greene (2004). When estimating the fixed effects models, we drop from the 
regression all the covariates that do not vary at the family level, such as the parental 
characteristics. Hence, our fixed effects results include only the daughter’s 
characteristics. Finally, note that all the groups with no variation in the dependent 
variable at the family level are bypassed during the estimation process
11
. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 The estimates reported in Table 4 indicate that our main results continue to hold 
even after controlling for family fixed effects. The coefficient of the grandchild care 
variable is 0.805 in the labor force participation equation and 0.535 in the labor force 
involvement equation. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The rest of our 
fixed effects results are consistent with our baseline findings, except that after controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity, we find a negative impact of the marital status variable on 
both the decision of the daughter to participate in the labor market and on her degree of 
labor market involvement.  
  
 4.3. The determinants of private transfers 
As a final step, we focus on the determinants of the parental transfers. Let *s  and 
*T  be two latent variables indicating the propensity of the parent to provide grandchild 
care *s and cash gift *T , respectively. The transfer equations can be written as :  
sssXs εβ +=*        (15) 
                                                          
11
 We also exclude the monetary transfer variable from the regression, as there is no sufficient variability of 
that covariate at the family level to get robust findings. 
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TTTXT εβ +=*        (16) 
where sX  and TX  are two sets of variables explaining the grandchild care and financial 
gift outcomes, sβ  and Tβ  are the vectors of associated parameters, and sε  and Tε  are 
two normally distributed random errors. The two latent variables *s  and *T  are not 
observed, but we have information on the observed counterpart of the transfer variables. 
Due to limitations with the data, we restrict our attention to the discrete transfer decisions 
of the parent, s  and T , respectively. We have 1=s  when 0* >s  and 0=s  otherwise, 
and 1=T  when 0* >T  and 0=T  otherwise. 
 It is possible that the error terms of these two equations are correlated with the 
error terms of the equation describing the decision of the daughter to participate in the 
labor market, so that we take this possibility into account in our estimation
12
. Let hsρ , 
hTρ , sTρ  be  the coefficients of correlation between hε  and sε , hε  and Tε  and sε  and 
Tε . Assuming that the residuals ),,( Tsh εεε  follow a trivariate normal distribution such 
that ),,,1,1,1,0,0,0(~),,( ThshsThTs N ρρρεεε , equations (14)-(16) define a trivariate Probit 
model. The model is estimated using the simulated likelihood procedure described in 
Capellari and Jenkins (2003). 
 The results, highlighted in Table 5, indicate that while the further education 
variable of the mother is negative and significant at the 1% level, the education level of 
the daughter is positive and significant at the same level. This observation is consistent 
with the sociological literature on intergenerational solidarity, which finds that mothers 
with lower levels of human capital tend to promote the professional development of their 
better endowed daughters (see Gerhard et alii, 2005). As expected, the higher age of the 
grandchild reduces the probability of regular grandchild care supply, while the 
probability of regular grandchild care increases if the daughter is not married and is 
younger. Once again, the cross-country patterns are consistent with those observed in 
Figure 1.  
                                                          
12
 For instance, it is reasonable to expect a positive correlation between the error terms from the labor 
supply and the grandchild care equations as higher propensity for grandchild care on the part of the parent 
increases the child’s time available for paid work. At the same time, the receipt of informal care may also 
require a higher taste for family involvement and leisure, implying a negative correlation between the 
residuals. 
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Insert Table 5 about here 
 Unlike time transfers, monetary transfers seem to be driven to a higher extent by 
the financial needs of the recipient and the financial ability of the donor. There is a strong 
positive impact of both current earnings and financial assets of the donor on the provision 
of monetary transfers. Better educated children are once again more likely to receive 
transfers than less educated children, while transfers are a decreasing function of the 
number of children of the donor. Finally, the results on the labor force participation of the 
daughter are consistent with those reported in column 1 of Table 3 and highlight a strong 
and positive impact of the grandchild care supply on the labor force participation of the 
daughter and no corresponding impact of monetary transfers. The rest of the results in 
column 1 are consistent with our previous findings.  
5/ Concluding comments 
 During the past several decades, much of the political economic debate related to 
the problems of ageing societies concentrated on the fiscal and informal care burden of 
the elderly population and on the productivity decreasing impact of the latter. Meanwhile, 
fertility and child related economic research focused almost exclusively on the impact of 
family related policies on the choices between motherhood and career, typically ignoring 
the provision of informal care. Based on both stylized facts and sociological evidence, we 
postulated that this approach to the fertility and ageing related problems of developed 
economies is overly restrictive and proposed a theoretical model and empirical estimates 
of the reduced form equations emanating from the model to fill the potentially important 
gaps in the literature. 
  Specifically, we consider a simple theoretical model linking informal grandchild 
care and monetary transfers provided by a benevolent parent to the time devoted by a 
transfer-receiving child to childcare, labor supply and leisure. The hypothesis that 
emanates from the model and is of greatest interest to us is the positive effect of 
grandchild care on the labor supply of young mothers. For Europe as a whole, we find a 
strong positive effect of grandchild care on both the labor force participation and labor 
market involvement decision of the mother, but no impact of monetary transfers on either 
of these decisions. We also find that both recipients and donors with better endowments 
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are more likely to participate in a monetary transaction, while in the case of time 
transfers, mothers with lower level of human capital tend to assist the professional 
development of their better endowed daughters.  
 A few shortcomings of our research have to be kept in mind when interpreting our 
results. First, we do not have sufficiently detailed information on the characteristics of the 
daughters. It would be useful to know the number of hours devoted to labor activities and 
to child-rearing activities, as well as the wage rate of the daughters that are working. 
Secondly, there is no way for us to control for the supply of formal childcare services, 
which is expected to influence the provision of grandchild care. If we had information on 
the daughter’s location, we could use it to control for formal childcare and local labor 
market conditions. Finally, we perform only a cross-section analysis of the relationship 
between grandchild care and labor supply. It is therefore difficult to fully understand the 
motivations of the parental transfers in this static framework, and the use of a long 
enough panel could be of interest for future research.  
Despite the shortcomings of our analysis, the results open a new dimension to the 
debate related to intergenerational transfers in ageing economies by taking a step away 
from the productivity deteriorating impact of informal elderly care. Furthermore, these 
results suggest that factors other than either personal and nuclear family endowments or 
family institutions may be an important determinant of young women’s choices between 
motherhood and career.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample, by type of transfer 
Variables No 
transfer 
Cash gift,  
no care 
No cash gift, 
care 
Cash gift, 
care 
All 
Characteristics of the parent
Age 63.43 61.26 61.75 59.98 62.60
Married 0.624 0.648 0.685 0.656 0.645 
Number of children 2.16 1.57 1.65 1.34 1.93 
Good health 0.456 0.398 0.436 0.336 0.439
Further education 0.505 0.699 0.402 0.534 0.492 
Income (log) 9.95 10.52 9.80 10.46 9.98 
Assets (log) 10.44 11.55 11.00 11.24 10.73 
Characteristics of the child
Age 36.29 35.18 34.90 33.76 35.68 
Married 0.768 0.699 0.798 0.656 0.765
Number of grandchildren 2.02 2.01 1.80 1.76 1.95 
Age of grandchildren 4.93 3.98 4.21 4.12 4.61 
Further education 0.675 0.858 0.642 0.748 0.684 
Number of observations 1365 176 645 131 2317 
Source: Share release 1, 2004.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by employment status 
Variables No work Part time Full time 
Characteristics of the child    
Age 34.80 35.99 36.21 
Married 0.787 0.746 0.758 
Number of grandchildren 2.02 1.98 1.87 
Age of grandchildren 4.09 4.97 4.84 
Further education 0.557 0.846 0.693
Receipt of transfers    
Monetary transfer 0.126 0.105 0.154 
Grandchild care 0.285 0.364 0.359
Number of observations 787 560 970
  Source : Share release 1, 2004. 
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Table 3. Estimates of the role of private transfers on the mother’s labor supply 
Variables 
Labor participation Labor involvement 
(1) (2) 
coef s.e. coef s.e. 
Constant -0.814*** 0.216   
Characteristics of the child     
Age 0.026*** 0.007 0.026*** 0.006
Married -0.029 0.073 0.001 0.063 
Number of grandchildren -0.164*** 0.034 -0.171*** 0.030 
Age of grandchildren 0.054*** 0.011 0.039*** 0.009
Further education 0.631*** 0.085 0.646*** 0.082
Country (ref: Sweden)     
Austria -0.424*** 0.129 -0.526*** 0.113
Germany -0.486*** 0.114 -0.700*** 0.096
Netherlands -0.081 0.103 -0.536*** 0.082 
Spain -0.205 0.131 0.029 0.128 
Italy -0.106 0.133 0.072 0.125
Greece -0.039 0.151 0.173 0.148 
Denmark 0.156 0.125 0.260** 0.115 
France 0.330** 0.135 0.401*** 0.125 
Switzerland -0.540*** 0.181 -0.802*** 0.138
Transfers     
Grandchild care 0.328*** 0.063 0.232*** 0.054
Monetary transfer -0.023 0.086 0.085 0.078 
Log likelihood -1362.9 -2339.1 
Source: Share release 1, 2004. 
Note: (1) is a Probit model, (2) is an ordered Probit model. Standard errors are clustered at the 
family level, significance levels being respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The sample 
includes 2317 observations. 
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Table 4. Fixed effect estimates of the role of grandchild care on the mother’s labor supply 
Variables 
Labor participation Labor involvement 
(1) (2) 
coef s.e. coef s.e. 
Characteristics of the child     
Age 0.041 0.032 0.072*** 0.025 
Married -0.839** 0.328 -0.709*** 0.225
Number of grandchildren -0.444*** 0.139 -0.400*** 0.102 
Age of grandchildren 0.138*** 0.046 0.093*** 0.033 
Further education 2.009*** 0.464 2.065*** 0.329
Transfers
Grandchild care 0.805** 0.344 0.535** 0.236 
Log likelihood -156.3 -485.0
Source: Share release 1, 2004. 
Note: (1) is a fixed effects Probit model, (2) is a fixed effects ordered Probit model. Significance 
levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The sample includes 2317 observations 
(1950 families). The number of bypassed groups in the fixed effects estimation is respectively 
1069 for the Probit model, and 740 for the ordered Probit model.  
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Table 5. Multivariate Probit estimates of labor force participation and transfers 
Variables Labor supply Grandchild care Monetary transfer 
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. 
Constant -0,844*** 0,228 0,896*** 0,338 -1,921*** 0,515 
Characteristics of the child       
Age 0,026*** 0,007 -0,021** 0,008 -0,011 0,011 
Married -0,027 0,071 -0,143** 0,072 -0,185** 0,084 
Number of grandchildren -0,163*** 0,034 -0,038 0,036 0,068 0,043
Age of grandchildren 0,055*** 0,011 -0,021** 0,011 -0,017 0,013 
Further education 0,625*** 0,086 0,284*** 0,086 0,212* 0,113 
Characteristics of the parent
Age -0,009* 0,006 -0,014* 0,007
Married   0,034 0,064 -0,157** 0,080 
Number of children   -0,168*** 0,023 -0,160*** 0,031 
Good health -0,041 0,059 -0,004 0,074
Further education   -0,265*** 0,085 0,153 0,099 
Income (log)   -0,011 0,020 0,199*** 0,038 
Assets (log)   0,018* 0,010 0,040*** 0,014 
Country (ref: Sweden)
Austria -0,431*** 0,131 0,491*** 0,130 -0,192 0,149
Germany -0,490*** 0,113 0,388*** 0,116 -0,170 0,129
Netherlands -0,084 0,105 0,478*** 0,108 -0,441*** 0,120 
Spain -0,213 0,134 0,668*** 0,135 -0,712*** 0,206 
Italy -0,119 0,133 0,778*** 0,134 -0,058 0,162 
Greece 0,325** 0,135 0,325** 0,134 -0,284* 0,163
Denmark 0,158 0,127 -0,091 0,135 -0,280** 0,141 
France -0,056 0,156 0,863*** 0,152 0,160 0,180 
Switzerland -0,551*** 0,174 0,758*** 0,172 -0,296 0,209
Transfers
Grandchild care 0,373*** 0,138     
Monetary transfer -0,005 0,203
Coefficient of correlation
Labor supply 1 - -0,030 0,077 -0,013 0,106 
Grandchild care 1 - 0,129*** 0,044
Monetary transfer 1 -
Log likelihood -3508.0 
Source: Share release 1, 2004. 
Note: Trivariate Probit model estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. Standard errors are clustered at the family 
level, significance levels being respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The sample includes 2317 observations. 
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Figure 1. The pattern of grandchildren care in Europe 
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Source : Share release 1, 2004. 
Note: Regular care is defined as care provided on daily or weekly basis. The graph is based on the 
sample of daughters in working age 18-65 who have at least one child of less than 10 years of age, and 
their elderly mothers. 
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Figure 2. The pattern of monetary transfers in Europe  
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Source : Share release 1, 2004. 
Note: The graph is based on the sample of daughters in working age who have at least one child of  
less than 10 years of age, and their elderly mothers. 
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Figure 3. The pattern of labor market participation in Europe 
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Source: Share release 1, 2004. 
Note: The graph is based on the sample of daughters in working age 18-65 who have at least one child 
of less than 10 years of age, and their elderly mothers. 
